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The aim of this paper is to present a search model in the ￿eld of
environmental economics, where so-called clean and dirty producers
enter the trading market, both looking for a partner with whom to
exchange the goods they are endowed with. The model derived in this
paper is rather simple. Nevertheless, it is able to produce a series of
interesting results and useful insights, and is conveniently used here
as a framework to explain the functioning of Joint Implementation
programmes for polluting emissions￿reduction.
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11 Introduction
Equilibrium search models were ￿rst introduced by Diamond (1982) as a
basic framework to illustrate how multiple equilibria might eventually arise
in economics. In the simplest version of the model there is only one good,
but it is assumed that producers do not consume their own output. In
fact, they move suddenly to an exchange sector where they meet bilaterally,
hence trade, consume, and ￿nally move back to the production sector again,
￿searching￿for new inventories to pursue continuously the aforementioned
economic behavior. Obviously, this simple framework can be complicated in
a number of di⁄erent ways. We can, for example, include more than one
type of commodity, or rather consider agents with di⁄erent tastes. In this
case, exchange itself becomes more di¢ cult, since you not only have to meet
another trader, but you have to meet the one who both has what you want,
and wants what you have (commonly referred to as the double coincidence
of wants, after Jevons, 1875).
It is a basic issue in search models to assume any investment decision to
be made ex-ante, before entering the market. In this case, when matching
frictions exist, bargaining agents are not able to get together, and conclude a
stable agreement, such that the Coase theorem cannot be applied anymore.
The problem here is that agents do not know who to talk with (i.e., they do
not know who is in the market, who the traders are), and free-riding prob-
lems are obviously very near. Room is left consequently for a governmental
intervention to make the socially e¢ cient outcome be eventually enforced.1
The bulk of literature dealing with search models mainly concentrates
on those markets where an ine¢ cient outcome due to market imperfections
occurs. In this light, many studies have particularly focused on the frictions
arising in job market unemployment analysis (e.g., Coles-Burdett, 2003; and
Wright, 1986), or rather in monetary economics (e.g., Kiyotaki-Wright, 1989;
and Corbae et al., 2003), though the same technique is suitable for many
other di⁄erent issues.
The aim of this paper is to present a search model in the ￿eld of envi-
ronmental economics, where two type of producers, broadly referred to as
￿rms belonging to developed (DC) and developing (LDC) countries, enter
1So-called co-ordination failures ￿nally arise, because each person is trying to anticipate
the action of others (make a decision now by anticipating the future), commonly de￿ned
as ￿matching frictions￿either (see, for example, Acemoglu-Shimer, 1999; and Burdett et
al., 2001).
2the exchange sector, face traders￿preferences towards their goods (hence-
forth, named projects), and achieve a particular market solution. The model
derived in this paper is rather simple. Nevertheless, it is able to produce a
series of interesting results and useful insights. In particular, we attempt to
use the presented framework to model the market for Joint Implementation
(JI) projects, and explain the reasons for which search theory can be applied
to such programmes generating emissions￿reductions (see, Liski-Virrankoski,
2004).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe
the main characteristic of a market for Joint Implementation projects, and
its similarities with a search market. In section 3, we derive the model,
taking advantage of Diamond￿ s (1982) ￿coconut parable￿ , and determine the
steady state equilibrium strategies. In section 4, we examine the results
obtained, and make a comparative static analysis to better understand what
policy intervention to increase social welfare is to be preferred. We ￿nally
show that a subsidizing policy to promote clean production processes is the
preferred instrument to solve the market imperfections, whenever the Coase
theorem might not be of help. A ￿nal section concludes, and a subsequent
Appendix provides all the necessary proofs.
2 Joint Implementation as a search market
Brie￿ y, Joint Implementation (JI) occurs when a donor country invests in
pollution abatement projects in a host country in return for a number of
￿credits￿ to comply its own pollution abatement targets. As a corollary
e⁄ect, the recipient nation will gain some foreign direct investment and a
stock of advanced technologies. Lastly, the atmosphere will bene￿t as these
reductions are met.2
In reality, some problems arise when dealing with JI projects. LDC
nations are, in fact, generally hostile towards JI, since transaction costs for
these projects might be prohibitively high, and above all fear that it will
threaten their sovereignty, reduce potential ￿ ows of foreign aid, and thus
￿nally impose an indirect control on the total amount of polluting emissions
being realized.
2Broadly, Joint Implementation is a programme under the Kyoto Protocol that allows
industrialised countries to meet part of their cuts in greenhouse-gas emissions by paying
for projects that reduce the level of polluting emissions in other countries.
3The rise of di⁄erent interests between DC and LDC countries is the
core of each international negotiation on environmental concerns. Indeed,
LDC countries often claim that environmental protection policies are unfair
because impose a burden on these countries that are not responsible for the
existing global level of polluting emissions. On the other hand, DC countries
prefer to avoid any home made emissions￿reduction that might also possibly
lower their economic growth. To solve this problem, the Kyoto Protocol
suggests the set up of a JI project.
As we can easily notice, an agreement on an acceptable JI project can
be viewed as a search problem, at least for the following reasons. First,
emissions￿reductions are di¢ cult to verify, and cannot coincide with the ex
ante investment decisions. This depends also on a variety of project-speci￿c
factors which are only learned in negotiations. Second, the donor coun-
try is typically an energy producer investor endowed with some advanced
home-made technologies, whereas the host partner typically o⁄ers abate-
ment opportunities which are best materialized using a particular low-level
technology. Consequently, a provider with a given technology needs to search
for a project that best matches his own technology.
In the next section, we present a model where a DC ￿rm and a LDC
￿rm might agree on a JI programme in order to comply with their emissions
target. That is to say, each host ￿rm cannot undertake its own project alone,
and therefore needs to search for a partner, the donor ￿rm, with whom to sing
a contract. Once the host and the provider ￿rms have met, they bargain over
the size of the project, and the potential output to be exchanged. Therefore,
if both ￿rms agree on the project, and the contract is signed, the donor ￿rm
￿nances the project, joint with a technological transfer, and leaves the pool
of unmatched ￿rms.3
In the next section, for the sake of simplicity, we restrict the analysis to
two type of producers, henceforth called clean and dirty, the former broadly
referred to as developed (DC) countries ￿rms, the latter to developing (LDC)
countries ones. We also set up a basic search model and justify each as-
sumption, and the terminology used, in the light of the aforementioned JI
programme.
3Once the project is realised, and the emissions￿reductions are veri￿ed, ￿rms may enter
the permit market, commonly assumed to be perfect and frictionless, and therefore left
out of our analysis.
43 The ￿environmental￿coconut model
The basic Diamond￿ s model (1982) we will be referring to throughout the pa-
per takes advantage of the so-called coconut parable to illustrate all the fun-
damental properties of an economy a⁄ected by problematic ￿matching fric-
tions￿to achieve an e¢ cient solution (see, for example, Mortensen-Wright,
2002).
The economy consists of islands, on some of which there are palm trees
of various height bearing coconuts of di⁄erent size. Individuals search for an
acceptable tree to climb in order to pick a desired nut.
Remark 1 To clarify the terminology used, we assume that
1. A clean production is called clean/dirty according to its compliance with
polluting emissions￿reduction.
2. Each coconut is a potential production opportunity.
3. Only ripe nuts represent a suitable JI project.
4. Consuming the coconut means the set up of the JI project.
Unfortunately, two strict laws in force in the archipelago cannot be amended.
The one states that no burden (i.e., tax) can be levied on whatever produc-
tion process in the market (free entry condition). The other one prescribes
a prohibition against consuming one￿ s own coconut (free trading condition).
Agents are thus forced to travel to a trading island on which they look for
others in a similar position with whom to trade. The key decision is then:
how much would be one willing to pay (which is the optimal size of a tree
one should accept to climb onto) to enter the exchange sector?
As noticed in section 2, we characterize our model by assuming two type of
producers, the clean (Nc) and the dirty (Nd) ones. The former are supposed
to respectfully interact with the environment, and pick up the nuts within
the carrying capacity of the tree, though the latter are mainly interested
in exploiting any palm as much as they can, thoughtlessly acting to the
detriment of future harvests. Moreover, we consider an economy containing
a continuum of in￿nitely lived agents, with a total population normalized to
unity. To simplify, we can thus write Nd = N, and Nc = 1 ￿ N.
An agent with no goods in inventory, either clean or dirty, enters a pro-
duction sector, where potential projects arrive according to a Poisson process
with constant arrival rate given by ￿ > 0 for the dirty, and by ￿￿ > 0 for
the clean ones (with 0 < ￿ < 1). That is to say, dirty productions occur at
5a greater probability, since harvest takes place despite the size of the nuts.
On the contrary, clean producers do particularly care about the nut to be
caught, leaving those still unripe fruits to future crops. Moreover, each po-
tential project yields one unit of the good, but while dirty productions arise
costlessly, clean productions require a nonnegative cost, denoted by c, ran-
domly distributed according to a distribution function, F(c). The value of
c is observed before the individuals decide whether or not to undertake the
project. A clean producer is then expected to choose an optimizing strat-
egy between incurring the cost of picking up the coconut, thus becoming a
trader, as opposed to remaining a producer, so delaying any action to future
occurrences. The utility of consuming one unit of whatever good is u > 0,
with an exception: an agent receives no utility from consuming a good he
has produced himself (i.e., there is no possibility to undertake a JI project
by one agent alone). Therefore, after producing, an agent proceeds to an
exchange sector where he looks to trade for something that he can consume.4
Remark 2 Only those agents that enter a clean production sector, by choos-
ing the appropriate coconut (project) are thus supposed to move and search
for another clean partner with whom to conclude a JI project to reduce their
total amount of polluting emissions.
In the exchange sector, agents meet trading partners bilaterally, according
to a Poisson process with arrival rate ￿ > 0. When two traders meet they
always exchange inventories one-for-one, after which they consume, enjoy
utility u, and proceed back to the production sector. Moreover, if agents
pessimistically believe that trading opportunities will be poor because ￿ is
relatively low, they will not be willing to pay a lot to move from production
to exchange. This implies a relatively slow ￿ ow into the exchange sector.
On the other hand, if they optimistically believe trading opportunities to be
good because ￿ is relatively high, they will be willing to pay more to move
from production to exchange. This implies a relatively fast ￿ ow into the
exchange sector. Consequently, in this model we not only have to determine
agents￿production strategies but also their trading strategies. To make things
more interesting, we shall complicate the model, and consider the di⁄erent
outcome arising in trade when exchange takes place either with a clean or a
dirty partner, and try to suggest a policy action to move the system towards
a ￿clean￿oriented solution.
4To simplify, let assume sailing to the exchange island be costless.
6Bearing in mind the assumptions made so far, we can formulate the prob-
lem faced by our agents through a standard backward induction analysis, that
is typical of each dynamic programming study. Let then i denote the agent￿ s
state. That is, i = d, if the agent is a dirty producer; i = c, if he is a clean
one; and i = t, if the agent enters the exchange sector, thus becoming a
trader. Consequently, we assume Vi represent the optimal value function,
discounted by a constant rate of time preference, henceforth called r, and ￿-
nally derive the expected pay-o⁄of whatever agent￿ s state by means of some
useful Bellman￿ s equations. To begin with, we shall derive the expected value
in steady state of being a dirty producer
rVd = ￿(Vt ￿ Vd ￿ ￿) = ￿(k ￿ ￿) (1)
where k = Vt ￿ Vd represents the reservation strategy of a dirty producer to
become a trader. In other words, the closer is k to zero, the higher is the
probability that a dirty producer will become a trader. Moreover, parameter
￿ measures an externality that might negatively a⁄ect the expected pay-o⁄,
as indiscriminate harvest of nuts will necessarily reduce future disposal of
this natural resource.5
Secondly, we derive the expected pay-o⁄ of being a clean producer, that
is
rVc = ￿￿Emax [0;Vt ￿ Vc ￿ c + "] = ￿￿
Z g
0
(g ￿ c + ")dF(c) (2)
where g = Vt ￿ Vc, as before, is the reservation cost of a clean producer
to become a trader, while ", as opposed to the above ￿, measures a positive
e⁄ect from embarking on clean productions, when agents do pay attention on
the nuts to be harvested within the capacity of the tree, whose reproduction
process shall be consequently bequeathed to future generations.6
Remark 3 Parameter ￿ represents a negative external e⁄ect (e.g., environ-
mental quality reduction) derived from not embarking on a JI project.
Remark 4 Parameter " represents a positive external e⁄ect (e.g., environ-
mental quality improvement) derived from embarking on a JI project.
5Let consider, for example, the damage arising from cutting down the palm tree at once
instead of climbing onto it to pick up the nuts, thus preventing from further production
occurrences.
6As commonly found in dynamic programming models Emax[x;y] is the expected value
of the maximum pay-o⁄ strategy to be chosen between x or y.
7Finally, we present the expected value of being a trader, when producers
decide to enter the exchange sector, and wait for meeting, with a probability
￿, someone to deal with. Hence
rVt = ￿[(1 ￿ ￿)(u ￿ k) + ￿(u ￿ g ￿ ￿)] (3)
Assuming that exchange among traders always takes place, the problem is
that we may encounter someone either carrying a dirty or a clean good, being
(1 ￿ ￿) the probability of meeting a dirty producer and ￿ the probability of
meeting a clean one. Each agent will consequently eat the obtained coconut
(so deriving utility, u), ￿nally moving back to the dirty or clean production
sector, depending on the swapping previously made. Our scope must be
then to determine whether an appropriate policy intervention could be set
to increase clean production processes, and drive a society towards natural
resource preservation. Particularly, we consider ￿ as a potentially small but
still positive transaction cost, in terms of disutility, an agent may incur each
time he accepts any clean good in trade (i.e., to undertake a JI project).
That is, for example, a case where agents are willing to pay a cost to make
any recycling policy be undertaken to clean up the environment, as an entry
fee for moving back to the clean production sector either.
De￿nition 1 A steady state equilibrium for the environmental coconut model
is a triplet (k;g;N) satisfying the expected pay-o⁄ equations for Vd, Vc, and
Vt, and the ￿ow movements of agents among sectors.
Furthermore, we ought to determine the steady state number of agents
devoted to whatever sector. To do so, we need to characterize our solution
in terms of ￿ ow movements from a state to another. That is, in equilibrium,
the ￿ ow into a sector must necessarily equal the ￿ ow out from that sector,
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Fig. 1: Coconuts￿archipelago
Mathematically, we should then write
￿N + ￿￿g(1 ￿ N) = ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)N + ￿(1 ￿ N)] (4)
that is, solving for N,
N =
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿g
￿(1 ￿ ￿g) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ 2￿)
(5)
or rather we can interpret the number of dirty producers (N) depending on
7The ￿ ow out from a sector (i.e., the ￿ ow into another sector) can be interpreted as the
number of agents that decide to switch their state at the probability they have to change
their status.






Fig. 2: Evolution of N
Since economic signi￿cance merely holds for N 2 [0;1], we may then easily
con￿rm that as convenience to become a clean producer raises (g increases),
the number of agents that decide to remain in the dirty sector necessarily
lowers (N decreases).9.
4 Comparative Statics
This section is devoted to a comparative static analysis that consequently
points out the evolution of our economy at some parameter changes. To
begin with, and to simplify the study, let assume the cost of picking up
a coconut be described by an upward sloping distribution function, that is
8Fig. 2 is drawn by assuming the following reasonable parameter values: ￿ = ￿ = ￿ =
1
2. In particular, we assume ￿ = 3
4, for we suppose a high probability to meet a trader
with a clean good.
9Formally, N is a decreasing function of g. Thus, dN
dg < 0, for all N 2 [0;1].
10F(c) = c.
Proposition 1 For any N 2 [0;1], a unique non-degenerate equilibrium for
the economy exists.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We can thus derive the equilibrium condition by means of a two-stage
procedure. Firstly, by means of Eq. (1) and (2), we obtain











while from Eq. (1) and (3), it follows
￿(k;g) ￿ k =
￿u ￿ ￿￿￿ + ￿￿
r + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
￿
￿￿g
r + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
(7)
A steady state equilibrium point (k￿;g￿) can be then obtained by means
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Fig. 3: Equilibrium point
11It can be of interest to determine how might the system react at some changes
occurring in the parameter space (￿;"). therefore,we characterize our model,
by de￿ning ￿ as a cost measure of any recycling policy being adopted, and
" as the positive e⁄ect arising from any clean policy action (e.g., clean air,
unpolluted ￿elds).
First of all, let assume a society basically oriented towards clean produc-
tions. Mathematically, this would imply " to be constantly rising. More
extensively, we can imagine this positive outcome as due to a subsidy a pub-
lic authority introduces to favour those producers that decide to engage in
clean activities (i.e., to realize a JI project). Equilibrium outcome will then
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Fig. 4: Subsidising policy
As a consequence, the ’(k;g) curve rotates to ￿ ’(k;g), and determines a new
equilibrium point (￿ k; ￿ g), with ￿ k > k￿ and ￿ g < g￿. Consequently, with a higher
probability, a bigger number of clean producers will enter the trading sector,
and put on the market an increasing variety of clean goods, thus raising the
existing environmental quality too.
On the contrary, if it is ￿ to be increased, only the ￿(k;g) curve will be
a⁄ected, so moving downwards, both reducing k and g to the new equilibrium
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Fig. 5: Increase in the recycling policy
Interpretation of this result is direct and straightforward. If we increase the
price (￿) of recycling our dirty produced good, we cannot be so sure about the
e⁄ect arising therefrom. Indeed, either the value of being a clean producer,
or the value of being a dirty producer do ￿nally increase. Both cases can be
justi￿ed. The former is probably due to a reduction in the number of clean
producers, which increases their market value; the latter might be simply
a consequence of unwelcome free-riding problems instead. Basically, in this
situation, a dirty producer takes advantage of an increase in the value of being
a clean one, that might solely pay the cost of cleaning up the environment
for the sake of the entire society.
5 Concluding remarks
Emissions￿reduction is a global problem in current economies. Trading mech-
anisms to comply with emission targets may occur when developed and devel-
oping countries trade over the same project to achieve the resulting optimal
13allocation. The aforementioned market may not be e¢ cient in its own struc-
ture, but deviations form the perfect market solution are very likely to arise.
The presence of market frictions and coordination failures particularly char-
acterize the market of joint implementation projects, and thus leave the door
open to a ￿search theory￿framework.
The aim of this paper has been twofold. On the one hand, we presented
a modi￿ed version of the famous Diamond (1982) coconut model in the light
of environmental economics, suitable for describing the functioning of joint
implementation programmes, where matching frictions arise, and might not
be solved through the common Coase theorem. On the other hand, we char-
acterized our model letting what we called as clean and dirty producers dwell
the same market, and ￿nally derive the associated outcome.
A comparative static approach has determined whether a policy inter-
vention might be useful to drive our economy towards a sustainable path,
where clean productions shall be hopefully achieved. Our analysis has con-
sequently pointed out that only when public interventions start subsidizing
clean productions (i.e., JI projects) our system will positively react to the
adopted policy; being nonetheless free riding problems very likely to occur
in any other case. In this light, any increase in the cost of recycling yields,
in fact, only some undesired (i.e., distorsive) e⁄ects.
Basically, we sustained that whenever a rule to correct for the market
failures could not be adopted, we had better intervene to subsidize our clean
agents, awaiting for e¢ ciency to be ￿nally restored.
Appendix




f(1 ￿ ￿)Vd + ￿(Vt ￿ ￿)g (A.1)
that is also
rVd = ￿(Vt ￿ Vd ￿ ￿) = ￿(k ￿ ￿) (A.2)
where k = Vt ￿ Vd.
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f(1 ￿ ￿)Vt + ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)(u + Vd) + ￿(u + Vc ￿ ￿)]g (A.5)
and also
rVt = ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)(u ￿ k) + ￿(u ￿ g ￿ ￿)] (A.6)
Subtracting Eq. (A.4b) from Eq. (A.2), we obtain



















On the other hand, by means of Eq. (A.2) and (A.6), we may write
rVt ￿ rVd = ￿ [u ￿ k ￿ ￿￿ + ￿(k ￿ g)] ￿ ￿(k ￿ ￿) (A.8)
which can be reorganized as follows
k =
￿u ￿ ￿￿￿ + ￿￿
r + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
￿
￿￿g
r + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
(A.8a)
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